Many social policies require substantial sacrifices by existing persons in order to benefit the members of distant future generations.
Particularly salient examples of this are the elaborate and expensive efforts now undertaken to prevent high-level radioactive wastes from polluting the biosphere, or the stringent restrictions that may be soon be imposed on burning fossil fuels in order to mitigate the long-term climate change consequences of global warming. However, this trade-off does not only exist in the environmental policy area. Many other social policies also call for substantial sacrifices to be made at least partly if not largely on behalf of distant future generations.
The existence of this trade-off presents a fundamental and difficult ethical question that is far too often overlooked by policy makers. Do we have any ethical obligations at all to the yet-unborn members of future generations? Are we under a moral obligation to consider their interests, as best we can anticipate what those interests will be, as well as our own concerns in making these policy decisions? Or are we morally free to choose among policies solely with regard to their consequences for existing persons, with no obligations to concern ourselves with their impacts on future generations? In this brief essay I will try to demonstrate that this is a far more difficult question to answer than is commonly realized.
If we do in fact have ethical obligations to take into account the impacts of our policies upon future generations, then this raises the derivative question of how then should we balance the interests of the members of those future generations with the rights and interests of existing persons? I will try to show that this is also a much tougher question to answer than is generally understood.
There is a fairly broad consensus among current policy makers that we do have ethical obligations to future generations to take their interests into account in choosing our actions. One rarely if ever hears arguments to the contrary. There is, of course, considerable controversy regarding the precise nature and scope of these obligations. But there does appear to be general agreement that we do have some such moral obligations that we need to respect. In addition, at least in America if not elsewhere, there is also a broad consensus that the primary analytical framework that should be used for measuring and balancing the legitimate interests of future generations against the interests of existing persons is a costbenefit analysis framework.
1 In this framework the impacts of a policy on each affected generation are measured by the yardstick of the willingness-to-pay of its members to enjoy or to avoid the policy' s consequences, and then those future impacts of the policy are appropriately discounted to a smaller present value, prior to their aggregation with its current impacts, in making an overall assessment of the merits of the policy. In other words, even a quite small initial policy impact will ultimately lead, after a period of time probably on the order of no more than a few decades at the most, to the entire human population that would have been born and lived their lives throughout the rest of eternity from that point on now never even coming into existence. 7 They will instead be replaced by a population consisting of genetically different
individuals. Yet another way to put this is that any social policy will have rapidly spreading and eventually universal person-altering consequences in that it will alter the fundamental genetic identities of all future persons. Moreover, those person-altering consequences can be seen to be necessary conditions of the existence of all future persons who come into existence, since those persons would never have been conceived and born absent the policy' s implementation. Those consequences make life possible for the members of future generations who are conceived and born, and will thus be far more significant to those persons than are all of the other impacts of the policy combined.
Most attempts to assess the ethical implications of policies that have long-term effects as well as immediate impacts, or to value in dollar terms the overall effects of such policies, have simply ignored these person-altering consequences. As a result, the conclusions that these efforts have reached are unfortunately irrelevant for assessing the relative merits of the actual choices that those policies present.
As an example, consider for a moment the seemingly rather radical approach of taking all of our existing high-level radioactive wastes, on which we now devote literally billions of dollars/year of resources to try to isolate from the biological environment, and simply putting those " Do you prefer the world that you now live in, facing as you do a perhaps quite serious ocean pollution problem resulting from our prior radioactive waste-dumping policy, to a world which is without such a radioactive waste problem, but which is also a world in which neither you nor any of the people you have ever known have ever come into existence?"
In other words, the proper hypothetical question to ask is " Do you If we do dump those wastes into the ocean, then those future persons who are conceived and born with the radioactive waste problem to deal with, if they thought about it, would be grateful for what we have done, in a sense, because they would not otherwise exist. On the other hand, one can at least imagine the untold zillions of what one might loosely call " unrealised potential persons," that is, persons who might have been conceived and born under other circumstances, but who as a result of our choices will now never actually be conceived. But those wholly imaginary and non-existent unrealised potential persons of course have no standing to complain about the particular choices that we have made. My conclusion, admittedly troubling but seemingly impossible to avoid, is that since we probably will not harm any actual future person by our ocean radioactive waste-dumping actions, since they would likely all strongly approve of our actions so that they could come into existence, then under the conventional secular, consequentialist ethical premises that underlie most modern thinking 8 we would simply not have violated any ethical obligations to anyone by dumping those radioactive wastes in the Pacific Ocean.
More broadly, and rather disturbingly, the pervasiveness of personaltering consequences means that any social policy that we undertake, no matter how radically present-oriented it is, and no matter how indifferent we are to its long-term consequences for future persons, is ethically self- The problem of person-altering consequences not only dramatically undercuts conventional, secular ethical thinking, but also renders rather useless the widely-used framework of cost-benefit analysis 9 that is based on the methodology of aggregating the willingness-to-pay of the persons affected by a policy to evaluate its merits. Let me briefly explain.
Conventional cost-benefit analysis assesses the impacts of policies on future generations by hypothetically positing the willingness-to-pay question to the same hypothetical future persons under two different scenarios, life with the policy impacts and life without the policy impacts, and then comparing the answers to evaluate the policy. 10 The assumption is therefore made, usually implicitly rather than explicitly, that the same future persons will exist whether or not a policy is implemented. This " same persons will exist either way" assumption is, however, clearly revealed to be untenable once one recognizes the existence of personaltering consequences. When conducting cost-benefit analyses, future persons' hypothetical willingness-to-pay valuations of a policy' s impacts should instead be made as compared to the actual, demonstrable alternative of those persons' non-existence, should that policy not be implemented.
Unfortunately, if the hypothetical willingness-to-pay question was to be posed in this proper fashion that contrasts the actual achievable alternatives, any policy whatsoever would likely receive a massive (if not infinite) positive valuation from each of the specific future populations of individuals that the policy will bring into existence. 11 Even if these valuations are then discounted quite heavily to reflect their futurity, one will still inevitably conclude that all policy alternatives whatsoever, including the null option of taking no action of any sort which would lead to the birth of a particular specific population of future individuals over time that would obviously favor that inaction, will generate massive future benefits. These massive future benefits extending for all eternity are obviously going to be impossible to meaningfully quantify and compare across alternatives, and in any event the size of those future benefits will completely dominate and render trivial any adverse policy impacts upon existing persons, no matter how widespread and severe those current impacts might be. 12 This bizarre, blanket result that all policy options whatsoever will generate massive net benefits of indeterminate size that completely dominate any adverse impacts upon existing persons would render any cost-benefit analyses done in this fashion rather useless as a practical tool for helping policy makers to choose among policy alternatives.
One could perhaps attempt to try to salvage in part the cost-benefit framework of analysis by, again, instead first applying a nonconsequentialist ethical criterion to assess the significance of a policy for future generations, rather than using the normal secular, consequentialist willingness-to-pay framework, and then attempt to quantify into dollar terms in some fashion this non-consequentialist assessment before aggregating it with the usual willingness-to-pay based assessment of the policy' s impacts on existing persons. 13 But I will be the first to admit that Moreover, cost-benefit analysis is now shown to be an untenable analytical approach, since cost-benefit analyses that ignore personaltering consequences are clearly irrelevant to the real choices at hand, and such analyses that incorporate person-altering consequences in the usual willingness-to-pay manner will always unhelpfully conclude that all policy options whatsoever will generate massive net benefits of uncertain magnitude that will completely dominate any adverse impacts upon existing persons.
So the person-altering consequences of policies indeed pose a significant intellectual problem, and one that I am admittedly at somewhat of a loss as to how to resolve. I hope that I have made clear, however, that the current practice of simply ignoring person-altering consequences is untenable, and that we need to figure out a better way to address those consequences.
1 " American government is becoming a cost-benefit state." Cass R. 
